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Note
The Controversial Demise of Zauderer:
Revitalizing Zauderer Post-NIFLA
Aaron Stenz
INTRODUCTION
All too often, the law is arcane, confusing, and fundamentally divorced from the day-to-day lives of average Americans.
Few, if any, average Americans have a tangible reason to care
about something as deeply separated from their lives as standing
doctrine.1 Even some aspects of the Bill of Rights likely fall beyond the scope of what the average American cares about on a
day-to-day basis.2 However, every American has seen a billboard, watched a commercial on TV, or endured a pop-up advertisement online.3 Nearly every American has bought something
or paid for a service.4 And it is here that the divide between the
law and daily life is closed.
 J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to
Professor Heidi Kitrosser for her expertise and thoughtful comments throughout this process. Thanks also to the editors and staff members of Minnesota Law
Review for their work on this Note and all of Volume 104, with special thanks
to Frances Fink, David Hahn, Jack Davis, and Sam Cleveland for editorial contributions. Copyright © 2019 by Aaron Z. Stenz.
1. Standing essentially involves a requirement that a party must have suffered an actual injury to a protected interest. Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
2. For instance, consider the doctrine of incitement under the First
Amendment. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (describing the incitement exception to First Amendment protections). Unless
someone is considering egging another on to do some illegal activity, they likely
have little interest in the legal doctrine surrounding incitement. See id.
3. See Louise Story, Anywhere the Eye Can See, It’s Likely to See an Ad,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/15/business/
media/15everywhere.html [https://perma.cc/6SBG-CDU8] (noting that consumers see thousands of advertisements and brand messages every day).
4. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-181450, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES–2017, at 1 (2017) (defining “consumer units”
as “families, single persons living alone or sharing a household with others but
who are financially independent, or two or more persons living together who
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For the most part, Americans choose which products or services they use by evaluating the information available to them.5
Indeed, there is an industry dedicated to this very idea: websites
and magazines provide consumers with the facts they need in
order to make an informed decision.6 While much of this information is readily available, either from the advertiser or seller
itself or third parties such as Yelp, sometimes the law steps in.
Despite its normal role as a restriction on government power and
excess, the First Amendment allows the government to compel
commercial speakers—anyone advertising or proposing a commercial transaction for profit—to provide consumers with additional information, especially when the commercial speaker may
be hesitant to disclose such information to consumers.7 In fact,
most consumers have likely seen information from some such
disclosure requirement, on anything ranging from lawyer fee arrangements to country-of-origin labels on meat packages.8 Given
the prominence of commercial disclosure laws and the importance of information to making informed commercial decisions, consumers should pay close attention to developments in
the law which may limit their access to information.
In National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra
(NIFLA), the Supreme Court fundamentally shifted how commercial disclosures are treated. In NIFLA, the Court struck
down a California law requiring crisis pregnancy centers to display notices regarding the availability of state facilities that provided abortions and other family planning services.9 Prior precedent allowed for governments to compel commercial actors to
disclose “purely factual and uncontroversial” information.10 The
NIFLA majority, however, determined that the notice required

share major expenses” and detailing the ubiquity of spending among consumer
units).
5. See Peter Dizikes, How Do We Decide Which Products To Buy?, WORLD
ECON. F. (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/04/how-do-we
-decide-which-products-buy/ [https://perma.cc/9Y7C-V8PB] (providing research
on consumer purchasing trends and decisions).
6. See, e.g., CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 21, 2019) https://www.consumerreports
.org/cro/index.htm [https://perma.cc/9KA4-H45B]; YELP, https://www.yelp.com/
[https://perma.cc/W73Y-WA5J].
7. See infra Part I.C.
8. See infra Part I.C.
9. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct.
2361, 2368–78 (2018).
10. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).

2019]

THE DEMISE OF ZAUDERER

555

by California law was not sufficiently factual and uncontroversial to fit within this precedent because abortion is “anything but
an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”11 While other courts implementing
the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard relied only on
the veracity of the information in determining whether a compelled disclosure was constitutional,12 the NIFLA majority took
a markedly different approach by holding that even indisputably
factual disclosures could fall outside the standard if the underlying topic is controversial.13 In effect, NIFLA fundamentally reshapes the law governing the flow of information to consumers
in the form of compelled commercial disclosures in a concerning
way.
While others have already flagged deeply problematic aspects of NIFLA,14 this Note focuses on the case’s engagement
with the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard. Part I
briefly explains compelled and commercial speech doctrines and
surveys the nexus of the two: the doctrine of compelled factual
disclosures in commercial speech contexts. Part I also explores
the importance of commercial disclosure requirements and why
they are worth protecting, as well as summarizing the road to
NIFLA. Part II examines the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard initially established in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel (Zauderer) as a confusing and problematic doctrine, particularly following its implementation in NIFLA.15 In
Part II, this Note argues that the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard requires reconsideration and revision because:
(1) the standard is (and has been since its inception) unclear and
confusing; (2) the post-NIFLA version of the standard subjects
commercial disclosure requirements to an impermissible potential for judicial bias; and (3) the standard as implemented in NIFLA separates the current doctrine from the consumer protection interests that it is supposed to serve.16 Part III builds upon
the discussion in Part II by proposing that wiping the Zauderer
slate clean and returning to the “unduly burdensome” test that
Zauderer espoused is the best way to address the problems
raised in Part II because the “unduly burdensome” test is far
11. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
12. See infra Part I.C.3.
13. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
14. See id. at 2380–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s
characterization of the regulation at issue as content-based).
15. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
16. See id.
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more clear, less prone to judicial bias, and better serves the consumer protection interests that underlie commercial speech doctrine.17 Ultimately, this Note shows that the NIFLA holding’s
implementation of the “purely factual and uncontroversial”
standard requires stringent reevaluation going forward.
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH, COMPELLED SPEECH, AND
COMPELLED FACTUAL DISCLOSURES IN COMMERCIAL
SPEECH
Although the First Amendment’s general protection of
speech is foundational to American democracy and has been vigorously defended in the courts, not all speech receives the same
level of protection. Cases involving First Amendment protections
of speech generally involve two distinct determinations: (1) what
the relevant test or standard is based on the facts at hand; and
(2) determining the outcome of applying the standard.18 Typically, restrictions on or regulations of speech based on content
are subject to strict scrutiny, a rigorous review that reflects a
high degree of skepticism with regard to government justifications and regulation of speech.19 However, in certain contexts,
the bar which the government must clear in order to constitutionally regulate speech is lowered, with courts being more receptive and less skeptical of government justifications and rationales and less concerned about the consequences of such
regulations.20 This Part discusses compelled and commercial
speech doctrines and the intersection of the two in the form of
compelled commercial disclosure doctrine, before examining the
California statute challenged in NIFLA and the NIFLA holding.
Sections A and B explore the Court’s compelled and commercial
speech jurisprudences respectively. Section C examines compelled commercial disclosure doctrine as the nexus of compelled
and commercial speech jurisprudence. Section D sets forth the
facts and legal outcome of NIFLA.
A. COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE: PROTECTING THE RIGHT
NOT TO SPEAK
“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra Part III.
See, e.g., NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–78.
See id.
See infra Parts I.B–C.
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orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.”21 Justice Jackson’s words in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette are the cornerstone upon which the
Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence is founded. Jackson encapsulated the core of compelled speech doctrine in one sentence:
Speech compelled by the state usually poses a grave constitutional threat and should be viewed with extreme distrust.22 The
Court expanded on this principle in Wooley v. Maynard, declaring “[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking
are complementary components” of the freedom of speech.23
In summary, two important points deserve emphasis. First,
the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence strongly disfavors
government attempts to compel speech on the basis of its content.24 Second, although the exact analysis courts have used in
compelled speech cases has been inconsistent, the general approach is akin to strict scrutiny.25 For instance, Barnette and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo—finding unconstitutional
a West Virginia Board of Education resolution requiring students to stand for the Pledge of Allegiance and a Florida statute

21. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). In Barnette, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to a West Virginia Board of Education resolution requiring all students and teachers to stand, salute the flag, and
recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Id. at 626. A group of students expelled from
school for noncompliance with the resolution due to their religious beliefs as
Jehovah’s Witnesses challenged that it violated their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Id. at 629–30. Justice Jackson agreed, penning the nowfamous quote above in his majority opinion. Id. at 642. Interestingly, Barnette
explicitly overruled the Courts holding in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,
decided only three years earlier and involving facts virtually identical to those
in Barnette. Id.; see also Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591, 595,
599–600 (1940) (upholding a requirement that students participate in the
pledge and relying on the importance of the educational system for inculcating
values, particularly that of national unity). The Barnette court overruled Gobitis
by holding that the individual free speech interest in not being compelled to
speak a message with which one fundamentally disagrees trumped the state
interest in cultivating values of national unity. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640–42.
22. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 692.
23. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707–08, 714–17 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459 (2018).
25. Timothy J. Straub, Fair Warning?: The First Amendment, Compelled
Commercial Disclosures, and Cigarette Warning Labels, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1201, 1206–13 (2013) (detailing the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence and
the analysis the Court has undertaken in reaching its conclusions).
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creating an affirmative duty for newspapers to publish the replies of political candidates criticized by the paper respectively—
appear to have relied only on a presumption against the constitutionality of compelled speech rather than conducting meansends analysis.26 In contrast, even though the Court ultimately
determined that requiring religious individuals to display New
Hampshire’s “Live Free or Die” motto on their license plates was
unconstitutional compelled speech, Wooley opened the door to
upholding laws compelling speech if the state could show a sufficiently compelling interest and employed proportionate and
least restrictive means to achieve its goal.27 Cases such as Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, in which the
Court rejected a California Public Utilities Commission order requiring utility companies to include political messages from
other speakers in the extra space of their billing envelopes, seem
to exemplify this trend towards strict scrutiny.28 In conclusion,
despite minor inconsistencies in approach, compelled speech doctrine is unified by a deep distrust of compelled speech requirements.
B. HARDIER SPEECH: WHY COMMERCIAL SPEECH IS LESS
PROTECTED
The unifying thread of compelled speech doctrine is that
compelling speech is presumptively unconstitutional, or at least
that speakers have a typically insurmountable right under the
First Amendment both to speak and not to speak.29 In contrast,
the core of the Supreme Court’s current commercial speech doctrine suggests that commercial speech deserves a lesser degree
of protection than other kinds of speech.30 This Section explores
the shifts within the Court’s commercial speech doctrine and explains the current state of the doctrine.

26. See id. at 1209; see generally Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that Florida statute that required newspaper to dedicate space for a political candidate to respond to attacks as an unconstitutional
infraction upon the freedom of the press and speech); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624.
27. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716–17; Straub, supra note 25, at 1209.
28. See Straub, supra note 25, at 1212 (noting the Pacific Gas Court’s implementation of strict scrutiny); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986).
29. See supra Part I.A.
30. See Nicole B. Cásarez, Don’t Tell Me What to Say: Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 63 MO. L. REV. 929, 932 (1998).
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Initially, in Valentine v. Chrestensen, commercial speech
was treated as commerce rather than speech and thus could be
regulated in ways that did not need to meet standards for regulation under the First Amendment.31 For instance, because passing out advertising handbills in the street or using nude dancing
to promote the sale of alcohol was commercial speech and thus
not within the purview of the First Amendment, courts were
much more deferential to their prohibition or regulation by local
governments.32 In 1976, the Court overruled Valentine and ushered in a new era for commercial speech doctrine.33 In Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., the Court heard a challenge to a Virginia statute forbidding
pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices.34 Justice
Blackmun’s majority opinion rejected Valentine’s holding that
commercial speech was less deserving of First Amendment protection than other types of speech.35 Justice Blackmun did, however, explicitly leave open the door to some regulation of commercial speech, saying that “[t]he First Amendment . . . does not
prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial
information flow [sic] cleanly as well as freely.”36

31. See id. at 932–33; see also Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53–
55 (1942), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). It is worth noting that the advertisement in
Valentine did contain non-commercial speech, but the court noted that the distributor had obviously included that material in a revised version of the advertisement in an attempt to avoid the ordinance rather than actually disseminate
ideas, and thus upheld the ordinance’s prohibition of the advertisement as
wholly commercial speech. Id.
32. See Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53–55 (upholding an ordinance prohibiting
the distribution of advertisements in the streets); Hodges v. Fitle, 332 F. Supp.
504, 509 (D. Neb. 1971) (holding that Valentine’s test should be applied to an
ordinance prohibiting the use of nude dancing to promote the sale of alcohol).
33. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court defined commercial speech as that “which does
no more than propose a commercial transaction[.]” Id. at 776 (Stewart, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 749–50.
35. Id. at 770–73 (holding that commercial speech is entitled to protection,
at least where the state is attempting to suppress the dissemination of “truthful
information about entirely lawful activity”).
36. Id. at 771–72. The Court distinguished the facts in the case from other
potential scenarios, suggesting states would have the authority to regulate commercial speech where the speech is false, deceptive, or misleading, or where the
speech advocates for illegal conduct. Id. at 770–73.
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In determining that commercial speech deserves protection,
albeit less protection than other forms of protected speech, the
Court pointed to “commonsense differences” between commercial and other kinds of speech for justification.37 First, the Court
suggested that commercial speakers are in a unique position
which allows them to verify the content of their speech.38 Second,
the Court asserted that commercial speech is more “durable”
than other types of protected speech and is thus less easily discouraged or chilled by regulation.39
Underlying this shift in doctrine from Valentine to Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy was an implicit recognition that commercial speech should be afforded First Amendment protection
because of the vital role it plays in informing and protecting consumers. Justice Blackmun’s opinion hinted at this recognition by
justifying the decision in part on the public’s interest in the free
flow of commercial information in order to allow consumers to
make the best decisions for themselves.40 The examples
Blackmun suggested as instances where the state could permissibly curtail commercial speech—namely commercial speech
that is untruthful, misleading, or proposes illegal transactions—
further hint at this recognition: untruthful or misleading speech
prevents consumers from exercising informed judgment, while
proposing illegal transactions may jeopardize the freedom of an
ignorant but participating consumer.41 Decreasing the broad
ability of the state to regulate what and when commercial information flows to consumers as a means of better aiding consumers may seem counterintuitive—many average Americans would
likely rejoice at the prospect of their lives being less inundated
with advertisements.42 However, decreasing the latitude for government regulation as a means of serving consumers is justified
37. Id. at 771 n.24.
38. Id. at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court assumed that since advertisers have a unique knowledge of and ability to access their own products,
they are well situated to check the veracity of their claims. Id.
39. This rationale assumes that since commercial speakers must advertise
in order to sell their products, they are less likely to be dissuaded from speaking
in the face of regulation. Id. at 772 n.24.
40. Id. at 763–65.
41. See id. at 771–72.
42. See Christopher Elliott, Yes, There Are Too Many Ads Online. Yes, You
Can Stop Them. Here’s How., HUFFPOST (Feb. 09, 2017), https://www.huffpost
.com/entry/yes-there-are-too-many-ads-online-yes-you-canstop_b_589b888de
4b02bbb1816c297 [https://perma.cc/MG6V-D46K] (providing resources to combat against unwanted advertisements).
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by considering two very important theoretical points: (1) there is
a fundamental and justified concern at the very core of First
Amendment protections for speech that the government, no matter how good its intentions, may be too heavy-handed in curtailing in speech;43 and (2) relying on the state to determine what
information is good for its citizens reeks of the paternalism that
has been viewed as disturbing since Plato’s Republic and that
has ultimately largely been rejected in the First Amendment
context.44 Ultimately, this recognition that protecting and informing consumers should be the primary justification for protecting commercial speech serves as the foundation for today’s
commercial speech doctrine.
In 1980, the Court modified its approach to commercial
speech again, but built on the same conception of commercial
speech as valuable primarily for its role in informing and protecting consumers.45 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York, the Court both
extended the lesser degree of protection mentioned in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy and implemented a new four-part test
to determine the constitutionality of advertising restrictions.46
Central Hudson involved a challenge to an order from the New
York utilities commission to utilities in the state to refrain from
promotional advertising in an attempt to reduce power usage
43. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down a law
against flag-burning despite the government’s justifications regarding protecting the flag’s inherent symbolic value because the law trenched too broadly on
freedoms of expression).
44. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. See generally PLATO, REPUBLIC 170–73 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2004) (c. 380 B.C.E.).
45. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S.
557, 561–64 (1980) (noting that commercial speech’s value is created by its ability to, but also limited by the extent to which it can, inform consumers). Some
have suggested that Central Hudson and the shift in doctrine it created came
as the result of an attempt to balance the competing concerns of paternalism
and consumer protection. See Cásarez, supra note 30, at 935–36. Indeed, the
Central Hudson opinion directly addresses this dichotomy by heavily emphasizing the value of commercial speech as arising from its informative value to consumers while simultaneously dismissing a paternalistic approach. See Cent.
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–62. Two cases preceding Central Hudson generally
represent these concerns as deployed by the Court. See Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding a state bar regulation prohibiting inperson self-promotion and solicitation by lawyers on consumer protection
grounds); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (using anti-paternalistic arguments to justify holding that attorneys have the right to advertise
their services and prices under the First Amendment).
46. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63, 566.
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during the energy crisis of the mid-1970’s.47 The Court defined
commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience” before implementing
the new four-part test.48
The Central Hudson test requires courts to consider four factors in assessing the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech. First, a court must consider whether the expression
in question falls within the purview of First Amendment protection, which requires that it “at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading.”49 Second, the court considers whether
the asserted government interest is substantial.50 If the court
decides in the affirmative with respect to both of these factors, it
then considers “whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted” and “whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”51 While the order in question in Central Hudson satisfied the first three factors, the Court held that it was an impermissible infringement
on protected speech due to overbreadth under the fourth factor.52
In sum, whereas the courts have vigorously defended the
right not to speak as fully protected by the First Amendment,53
courts have given commercial speech less protection because it
is more “durable” or “hardy.”54 The protection that is extended to
commercial speech is justified by commercial speech’s value in
informing and protecting consumers.55 The constitutionality of
restrictions on commercial speech is assessed by using the fourfactor Central Hudson test.56 Although the test has been interpreted quite deferentially to state interests and justifications in
47. Id. at 558–59; see also Cásarez, supra note 30, at 936–37.
48. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
49. Id. at 566.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 569–70 (holding that although the state’s interest was substantial, the order in question would have also applied to advertisements advocating
reduced energy usage, and thus was too broad to effectively accomplish the
state’s interest).
53. See supra Part I.A.
54. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976); see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6.
55. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
56. The standard of review in these commercial speech cases is generally
considered to be intermediate scrutiny. See Allen Rostron, Pragmatism, Paternalism, and the Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 37 VT. L. REV.
527, 530 (2013).
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the past,57 more recently the Supreme Court has been less deferential, instead implementing the test in a way which potentially expands protections for commercial speech and views paternalistic state interests with greater skepticism.58
C. ZAUDERER AND BEYOND: COMPELLED FACTUAL
DISCLOSURES BY COMMERCIAL SPEAKERS
The Supreme Court’s compelled commercial disclosure doctrine, initially implemented in Zauderer,59 represents the confluence of the compelled and commercial speech doctrines discussed
in Sections A and B. This Section outlines the importance of compelled commercial disclosures and examines Zauderer in detail
as the foundational case for compelled factual disclosures before
exploring other pre-NIFLA implementations of the Zauderer
standard.
1. Compelled Commercial Disclosures: A Conceptual
Background
Commercial disclosure requirements are justified by the
idea that consumers will be able to make better decisions when
purchasing products and services if they have more information.60 This reasoning mirrors Justice Blackmun’s reasoning
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy that curtailments on commercial speech deprive consumers of information necessary to
make informed commercial decisions.61 Because sellers have
57. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328,
332, 340–46 (1986), abrogated by 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484 (1996).
58. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,
417–28 (1993).
59. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
60. See Nat’1 Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d Cir.
2001). The court stated:
[M]andated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information
does not offend the core First Amendment values of promoting efficient
exchange of information or protecting individual liberty interests. Such
disclosure furthers, rather than hinders, the First Amendment goal of
the discovery of truth and contributes to the efficiency of the “marketplace of ideas.” Protection of the robust and free flow of accurate information is the principal First Amendment justification for protecting
commercial speech, and requiring disclosure of truthful information
promotes that goal.
Id. (citation omitted).
61. See supra notes 33–41.
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more knowledge about their wares than consumers, and that information would aid consumers in making informed decisions,
governments have a strong interest in maintaining the marketplace of ideas and requiring sellers to disclose that information,
particularly when the speech is misleading.62 Commercial disclosure requirements serve important purposes, both for the government and consumers.
Commercial disclosure requirements inform consumers
about products and services they use daily. They inform consumers of toxic substances in their products.63 They protect from undisclosed costs,64 identify the origins of our food,65 disclose
whether minerals are conflict free,66 inform of calorie amounts
at restaurants,67 and generally serve the interests of consumers
in a myriad of other fashions. They provide information that consumers are deeply interested in: what consumer wants to buy a
potentially toxic light bulb?68 Thus, in situations like these, the
scales become tipped against the fundamental right to not speak
described above: although all of the commercial speakers described in this paragraph likely had some interest in nondisclosure—such as lower costs or avoiding reduced interest in their
product—the interest of consumers in making informed decisions about their purchases simply outweighs that of commercial
speakers. While not all of these requirements passed judicial
62. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (describing public access to information regarding
products and services in a free enterprise economy as “indispensable”); see also
id. at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring) (assuming that since advertisers have
unique knowledge of their own products, they are well situated to check the
veracity of their claims). Zauderer also notes that sellers have a minimal interest in not providing such factual information. 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). Courts
have recognized maintaining the marketplace of ideas as important. See Nat’l
Elec., 272 F.3d at 113–14; see generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gerald
Dworkin ed., Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1997) (1859) (setting forth
Mill’s conception of the “marketplace of ideas”).
63. See Nat’l Elec., 272 F.3d at 107; see also Robin A. Bernhoft, Mercury
Toxicity and Treatment: A Review of the Literature, 2012 J. ENVTL. & PUB.
HEALTH 1 (2012).
64. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 636, 650–53.
65. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (AMI), 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (en banc).
66. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by AMI, 760 F.3d at 18.
67. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, No. 08 Civ.
1000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008).
68. See, e.g., Nat’l Elec., 272 F.3d at 107.
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muster, they collectively demonstrate the importance of commercial disclosure requirements as a means of informing, and
thus to some extent protecting, consumers.69
2. Zauderer: The Origin of Lesser Protections for Compelled
Commercial Disclosures
In Zauderer, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to three
Ohio state rules regulating the content of attorneys’ advertisements.70 An Ohio attorney ran several advertisements: one advertising that the attorney would represent drunk driving defendants and refund all legal fees if they were convicted, and one
advertising counsel in the Dalkon Shield litigation on a contingent fee basis, with no “legal fees” unless they recovered.71 The
Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel argued that the advertisements were misleading and violated Ohio professional responsibility rules regarding contingent fees.72 The rules in question
generally prohibited certain types of advertisements deemed
misleading or otherwise problematic.73 In analyzing the first two
rules, the Supreme Court applied the Central Hudson test.74 The
Court’s analysis of the third rule, however, which required attorneys advertising contingency fee rates to disclose whether clients would still owe costs and other expenses for ultimately unsuccessful claims, is far more interesting.75

69. See Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, National Institute of Family &
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 132 HARV. L. REV. 347, 354 (2018) [hereinafter Leading Cases: NIFLA] for additional examples of other commercial disclosure requirements; see also NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380–81 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 629–36 (1985).
The plaintiff, a lawyer whose advertisements had been deemed illegal under
several different rules, challenged three separate rules. Id. Two of these rules
restricted the content of advertisements by lawyers, while the third rule required advertisements including contingency rates to disclose whether potential
clients would remain liable for the costs and expenses of unsuccessful claims.
Id. at 636.
71. Id. at 626.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 641, 647–48. One rule was a ban on self-recommendation and
unsolicited legal advice, while the other was a ban on the use of illustrations in
advertising. Id. at 639–41, 647–48.
75. See id. at 636, 650–53.
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With respect to the third rule, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the state would need to show that his advertisements were false or deceptive regarding potential costs or
that the rule served some substantial state interest other than
deception.76 Instead, the Court pointed to fundamental differences between the compelled factual disclosure at issue and compelled speech jurisprudence generally, declaring that the rule
only prescribed “what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising” and that it took “the form of a requirement that appellant
include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which his services will be available.”77 The Court reasoned further that since the primary justification for extending First Amendment protection to
commercial speech lay in the value it provided to consumers, the
plaintiff had only a minimal constitutionally protected interest
“in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising[.]”78 The implicit rationalization was that, akin to Justice
Blackmun’s reasoning in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,79
the disclosures had a significant value to consumers.80 Based on
this logic, the Court held that the third rule did not infringe upon
the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.81
In essence, the Zauderer court rejected the Central Hudson
test (the test governing when the government can regulate commercial speech generally)82 in the context of compelled factual
disclosures by commercial speakers and instead implemented a
new test that is less stringent than both the Central Hudson test
and strict scrutiny.83 The Court held that the First Amendment
76. Id. at 650.
77. Id. at 651. The Court also noted that compelled commercial disclosures
were less concerning than restrictions on commercial speech. See id. at 650.
78. Id. (emphasis in original). The Court was, however, careful to note that
disclosure requirements could infringe upon the First Amendment rights of advertisers, particularly if the disclosure requirements are “unjustified or unduly
burdensome[.]” Id. at 651 (holding also that “an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers”). The Court declined
to require a least-restrictive means analysis or that disclosure requirements not
be underinclusive. See id. at 651 n.14.
79. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
80. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
81. Id. at 652–53.
82. See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text.
83. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651–54; see also Straub, supra note 25, at
1216. It is unclear, however, whether the Zauderer Court intended its language

2019]

THE DEMISE OF ZAUDERER

567

rights of an advertiser are protected adequately so long as the
disclosure requirement is reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing consumer deception and declined to engage in
a strict least-restrictive means analysis.84
It is important to note that although Zauderer revolutionized the way in which courts consider compelled commercial disclosures under the First Amendment as it did not provide a clear
roadmap for how the new doctrine was to be implemented. Indeed, the Zauderer majority, whether through omission or design, did not indicate exactly how future courts should determine
when to apply the new and deferential approach.85 At face value,
the language of Zauderer suggests that the majority intended for
future courts to give deference86 to all compelled commercial disclosure requirements so long as (1) the requirements were
“. . . reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers . . .” and (2) not unjustified or unduly burdensome.87 Similarly, the Court’s other language, namely that
the requirement prescribed “what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising” and that it took “the form of a requirement that
appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which his services
will be available[,]” seems intended to distinguish the disclosure
requirement from presumptively unconstitutional compulsions
justifying its use of less stringent scrutiny on the facts before it to be a “test,” or
even anything more than an explanation of one set of circumstances where such
deference might be warranted. See infra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.
84. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651, 651 n.14.
85. See id. at 650–51.
86. Although Zauderer itself did not term its approach as one of deference,
subsequent cases, such as NIFLA, have referred to the departure from strict
scrutiny or the Central Hudson test as Zauderer deference. See NIFLA, 138 S.
Ct. 2361, 2376–77 (2018) (referring to Zauderer’s deferential review). Within
the broader First Amendment context, this terminology makes sense: typically,
government actions affecting speech are viewed with the utmost suspicion and
vigorously reviewed under strict scrutiny. Under Zauderer, government actions
compelling commercial speech are viewed as less problematic, meaning courts
are more willing to listen to, or defer to, government rationales. Id. at 651.
87. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. This interpretation of when the Zauderer
majority intended for Zauderer deference to apply is supported by the Zauderer
opinion’s analysis of whether the disclosure requirement at issue survived under the new deference (as opposed to the Court’s analysis of how the disclosure
requirement was different from compelled non-commercial speech). See id. at
651–53 (determining that the disclosure requirement at issue was constitutional because it was reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing
consumer deception); cf. id. at 651 (distinguishing the disclosure from the
Court’s compelled non-commercial speech jurisprudence).
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of non-commercial speech rather than be indicative of a threshold requirement for Zauderer deference to be applied.88 Despite
the support for this interpretation, it remains unclear exactly
how the Zauderer Court intended later courts to apply Zauderer
deference. As this Note shows, this lack of clarity has led to a
variety of interpretations of Zauderer in different cases, including—and perhaps especially—NIFLA.89
3. Pre-NIFLA Implementations of Zauderer: A Survey
To begin, Zauderer has not been applied to disclosure requirements unless the speech at issue is purely commercial. In
Meese v. Keene, the Court did not even reference Zauderer because of an implicit recognition that the facts of the case did not
suggest commercial speech even though it involved a disclosure
requirement.90 In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of
North Carolina, Inc., the Court applied strict scrutiny instead of
Zauderer deference to a disclosure requirement on speech that
had “inextricably intertwined” aspects of both commercial and
fully protected speech.91 In essence, Meese and Riley indicate
that Zauderer is not applied to disclosure requirements unless
the speech at issue is purely commercial.92
When applying Zauderer, courts have varied in how broadly
they interpret its scope.93 For instance, courts have diverged as
to what degree of potential to mislead there must be94 and what
88. See id. at 651; see also supra Part I.A.
89. See infra Part I.C.3–D.
90. 481 U.S. 465, 471–72, 485 (1987) (involving a challenge to a federal disclosure requirement requiring denotations on films deemed to be “political propaganda” as defined by statute). The case involved a plaintiff who wanted to show
three foreign films but did not want be referred to as a disseminator of “foreign
political propaganda” as defined by the statute. Id. at 467. Despite the non-application of Zauderer, the Court’s reasoning in upholding the disclosure requirement was analogous to the consumer protection rationales invoked by the Zauderer Court. See id. at 480–81; see also supra notes 76–81 and accompanying
text.
91. 487 U.S. 781, 784, 795–98 (1988) (involving a North Carolina statute
requiring professional fundraisers soliciting charitable donations to disclose to
donors the actual percentage of contributions the represented charities would
receive in order to prevent contributors from being misled as to the impact of
their donations).
92. See Straub, supra note 25, at 1221 (summarizing Meese and Riley).
93. See Note, Repackaging Zauderer, 130 HARV. L. REV. 972, 979–83 (2017).
94. This refers to how misleading the speech must be in order for the disclosure requirement to receive Zauderer deference. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop &
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 234, 249 (2010); Ibanez v. Fla.
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governmental interests95 are permissible under Zauderer. While
many cases prior to NIFLA—such as R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
v. FDA and Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. Sorrell—interpreted
Zauderer expansively in both respects, a number of cases began
to push back on the trend towards expansion, leading to inconsistent approaches across jurisdictions.
As part of this push back against expansive interpretations
of Zauderer, some courts have responded by implementing a
threshold requirement that must be cleared before Zauderer deference is due.96 In Zauderer, the Court justified upholding the
disclosure requirement at issue in part because the compelled
disclosure was of “purely factual and uncontroversial information[.]”97 Recently, some courts have begun using this phrase

Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by AMI, 760
F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); cf. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v.
United States, 674 F.3d 509, 558 (6th Cir. 2012); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 651) (“A regulation that imposes a disclosure obligation on a potentially
misleading form of advertising will survive First Amendment review if the required disclosure is ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”’); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 641 (6th
Cir. 2010); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785,
796 (8th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 559 U.S. 229
(2010). Some courts have also applied Zauderer where there is no potential to
mislead. See AMI, 760 F.3d at 22; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1214;
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009).
95. For instance, courts have differed over whether “consumer interest”
(meaning the level of interest expressed by consumers in receiving additional
information on a topic) alone is a permissible government interest. See Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 982–83; see also Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v.
Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that although Vermont’s asserted interest in “the demand of its citizenry for . . . information” was genuine,
it was inadequate to justify a disclosure requirement); cf. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v.
Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 597–98 (D. Vt. 2015) (upholding a compelled disclosure requirement regarding the use of genetic engineering in food products
because it provided consumers with information they could use in deciding
whether to purchase products), appeal filed, No. 15-1504-cv (2d Cir. May 6,
2015).
96. See Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 983–86.
97. 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). Until relatively recently, implementing this
phrase from Zauderer in the analysis of whether a compelled disclosure fell
within the purview of the Zauderer test was uncommon. See Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Sch. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 206 (D. Mass. 2016) (“[F]ew
courts have considered the constitutionality of disclosure regulations that fail
the ‘factual’ or ‘uncontroversial’ prerequisites of Zauderer.”).
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as a means of rejecting compelled disclosures that might otherwise be permissible under expansive interpretations of Zauderer.98 For instance, the court in Massachusetts Ass’n of Private
Career Schools v. Healey ruled one compelled disclosure “sufficiently controversial” to preclude the application of Zauderer deference.99 Similarly, courts in other cases have declined to apply
the Zauderer test where the information was not sufficiently factual.100 In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, for example, the
D.C. Circuit held that regulations compelling the inclusion of
graphic messages on cigarette packaging were not compelling
purely factual disclosures and thus were not subject to the Zauderer test.101 The Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning in holding the Zauderer test was inapplicable to a regulation requiring
the disclosure of information on how to avoid radiation exposure
from cell phones.102 However, such deployments of the purely
factual and uncontroversial prongs as a prerequisite for applying
the Zauderer test were not the norm.
98. See Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 984 (noting also that there
is “[n]o consistent understanding of what either ‘factual’ or ‘controversial’
means” in the context of compelled disclosures). Courts have apparently implemented these as two separate elements, rejecting as impermissible disclosure
requirements that were either controversial or not factual. See id.
99. 159 F. Supp. 3d at 207. The regulation challenged in the case characterized representations by schools that their credits “are or may be transferable”
as “unfair or deceptive” unless the school identified other schools with which it
had transfer agreements and indicated it was unaware of other schools which
would accept the transfer of its credits. Id. at 206–07. The court reasoned that
because this might force schools which had informal knowledge of the transferability of their credits to refrain from speaking at all and avoid the risk of making a false statement, the requirement was sufficiently controversial to preclude
the application of the Zauderer test. Id. at 207.
100. See Repackaging Zauderer supra note 93, at 985.
101. 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Some of the graphic warnings (intended to warn of the dangers of smoking) required under the regulations in the
case included “images of a woman crying, a small child, and [a] man wearing a
T-shirt emblazoned with the words ‘I QUIT,’” which the court concluded were
“primarily intended to evoke an emotional response[.]” Id. This is not the only
time that the D.C. Circuit has declined to use the Zauderer standard based on
a characterization of the disclosure as not purely factual. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.
v. SEC, (NAM) 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, (NAM II), 800 F.3d
518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
102. CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 494 Fed.
App’x 752, 753 (9th Cir. 2012). The court reasoned that since the regulation
could “be interpreted by consumers as expressing . . . [the] opinion that using
cell phones is dangerous[,]” it was not purely factual and thus Zauderer did not
apply. Id.
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In brief, while Zauderer articulated that compelled disclosures of factual information in the commercial speech context
are subject to a lower standard of review than even normal commercial speech, subsequent cases have struggled to conclusively
interpret Zauderer. Many courts have interpreted Zauderer expansively, particularly with respect to the types of disclosures
subject to its deferential test and the justifications governments
may use in compelling factual disclosures. However, other courts
have pushed back on this trend with more narrow interpretations of Zauderer and its test, typically invoking the “purely factual and uncontroversial” language from Zauderer as a prerequisite to applying Zauderer scrutiny. In essence, then, little was
truly clear about the Zauderer test prior to NIFLA other than
that the state of the law was unclear.
D. NIFLA: A NEW CHAPTER IN COMPELLED COMMERCIAL
DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
The NIFLA holding has the potential to create a seismic
shift in compelled commercial disclosure doctrine because of the
Court’s interpretation of when and how Zauderer scrutiny is to
be applied. This Section delves into the NIFLA holding to explore
its impact, beginning by examining the statute at issue in NIFLA and providing a detailed factual background to the Supreme
Court’s decision before analyzing the decision and outlining its
legal import.
1. The Facts and the FACT Act
Abortion has been at the center of a particularly heated debate in the U.S. for decades. While protests outside of abortion
clinics103 are well-recognized expressions of anti-abortion sentiment, other abortion opponents have opened facilities called crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs), which attempt to draw in women
considering an abortion and convince them to rear the child or

103. See, e.g., U.S. Abortion Clinics Face Surge of “Emboldened” Protesters,
Survey Shows, CBS NEWS (May 7, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us
-abortion-clinics-face-surge-of-trespassing-and-blockades/
[https://perma.cc/
B2U2-UV24]. Some abortion opponents opt for more violent means. See Liam
Stack, A Brief History of Deadly Attacks on Abortion Providers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/29/us/30abortion-clinic
-violence.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=999F61F060A787D
9722C2967F238BBAA&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL.
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put it up for adoption.104 CPCs are more widely known for deceptive and misleading practices than the services they provide.105
As a result, a number of government entities, including California, began to regulate CPCs.106
California passed the Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act) in
2015 to regulate CPCs.107 The FACT Act required licensed facilities providing ultrasounds, contraception, pregnancy tests, and
abortions to post notices informing patients of California’s free
and low-cost family planning services, prenatal care, and abortion.108 Unlicensed facilities providing pregnancy tests, prenatal
care, or ultrasounds were required to include the following notice
in advertisements and display it on-site: “This facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California and has no
licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the
provision of services.”109
A group of pro-life pregnancy centers challenged the FACT
Act, alleging the Act violated the rights of free exercise of religion
and free speech.110 The district court rejected the claims, finding
104. See Amy G. Bryant & Jonas J. Swartz, Why Crisis Pregnancy Centers
Are Legal but Unethical, 20 AMA J. ETHICS 269, 269 (2018) (arguing that CPCs
do not live up to the standards of medical care by and to which actual doctors
and other medical professionals live and aspire).
105. Id. at 270–71 (noting deceptive practices and medically false advice). In
addition to criticisms by legitimate medical providers, CPCs have also drawn
negative media attention for their practices and lack of accountability. See, e.g.,
LastWeekTonight, Crisis Pregnancy Centers: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
4NNpkv3Us1I [https://perma.cc/CZB4-KDTT].
106. See S.F., CAL. ADMIN. CODE ch. 93, §§ 93.1–.5 (2011); BALT., MD.,
HEALTH CODE §§ 3-501 to 3-505 (2009); MONTGOMERY CTY., MD., COUNCIL RES.
NO. 16-1252 (2010); N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 20.815–16 (2011); AUSTIN,
TEX., CITY CODE ch. 10-10 (2012). For a detailed discussion of each of these
ordinances, see Beth Holtzman, Have Crisis Pregnancy Centers Finally Met
Their Match: California’s Reproductive FACT Act, 12 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 78,
88–95 (2017). However, most of these provisions faced legal challenges and were
struck down, at least in part. See id.
107. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123470–73 (West 2018); see also NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018).
108. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 123471(a), 123472(a). Facilities had the option to distribute the notice in a number of different ways, including by posting
it conspicuously or distributing it digitally on the patient’s arrival. Id.
§ 123472(a)(2), invalidated by NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2361.
109. Id. § 123472(b)(1), invalidated by NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2361.
110. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, No. 15-CV-2277
JAH(DHB), 2016 WL 3627327, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016).
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that the law with respect to the licensed clinics survived both
rational-basis and intermediate scrutiny.111 The court found that
the law with respect to the unlicensed clinics would survive any
level of scrutiny.112
A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed, relying on Circuit precedent
which detailed a spectrum of professional behavior ranging from
highly protected public dialogue to more lowly protected professional conduct.113 The Ninth Circuit found that the FACT Act
resided in the middle of the spectrum.114 The court upheld the
licensed clinic notice, citing the state’s compelling interest in ensuring women could access state-provided reproductive care and
noting the notice was narrowly drawn.115 The unlicensed clinic
notice was also upheld, with the court holding that it would survive even strict scrutiny.116 The case then proceeded to the Supreme Court.117
2. The NIFLA Holding
The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
with Justice Thomas writing for a 5-4 majority and finding both
requirements of the FACT Act to be unconstitutional contentbased regulations of speech.118 First, the Court rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s professional speech continuum, declaring that
the only exceptions to strict scrutiny for content-based regulations were laws requiring the disclosure of factual, noncontroversial information under Zauderer and laws regulating professional conduct under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.119 Second, the Court held that the licensed notice requirement did not fall into either the Zauderer
111. Id. at *7–8.
112. Id. at *9 (reasoning that the state had a compelling interest in ensuring
patients knew whether a provider was licensed and determining the law was
narrowly tailored to that interest).
113. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839 (9th
Cir. 2016).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 841–42.
116. Id. at 843.
117. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
118. Id. at 2371, 2375, 2378. The majority characterized the FACT Act as
content-based because compelled disclosures, which force a speaker to convey a
particular message, alter the content of the speaker’s speech. Id. at 2371.
119. Id. at 2372. In Casey, the Supreme Court heard a challenge by abortion
clinics and physicians to a series of Pennsylvania statutes imposing informed
consent requirements for abortions and other similar abortion restrictions. 505
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or Casey exceptions.120 The Court rejected application of Zauderer to the licensed notice requirement because the notice requirement applied to state, not clinic services, and included
“abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”121
Third, the Court held that the unlicensed notice requirements would fail even if Zauderer was applied, as California
failed to prove that they were not “unjustified and unduly burdensome.”122 In determining that the unlicensed requirement
was unjustified, the Court asserted that California’s justification
for the notice requirement, namely in “ensuring that ‘pregnant
women in California know when they are getting medical care
from licensed professionals[,]’” was no more than “purely hypothetical.”123 The Court concluded that the regulation was unduly
burdensome on two primary grounds. The Court reasoned that
the requirement was under-inclusive, and thus unduly burdensome, because it applied only to CPCs rather than all facilities
where there might also be confusion over whether the facility

U.S. 833, 844–45 (1992) (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). While
the majority of the case involved consideration of abortion rights generally, the
case has had significant First Amendment implications. See generally id. One
of the statutory sections challenged was an informed consent requirement, requiring that a physician provide certain information regarding “risks” of abortion (specified by the state) to any woman seeking an abortion at least 24 hours
before the abortion was performed. Id. at 844. The plaintiffs argued that this
was a violation of doctors’ First Amendment rights and amounted to unconstitutional compelled speech. Id. at 884. The Court rejected this challenge, however, noting that “the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State[.]” Id. In First Amendment doctrine, therefore, Casey has come to stand for the idea that government can permissibly regulate professional (licensed) conduct, such as that of physicians, even though
the First Amendment speech rights of the professional are “incidentally” infringed upon. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
120. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372–74. Justice Thomas reasoned that the licensed notice requirement was distinguishable from the permissible regulation
in Casey because the requirement was not one of informed consent (i.e. providing a list of risks and benefits) and was held out to anyone who entered the
facility rather than to a specific patient seeking a specific procedure. Id. at
2373–74. Thus, he determined that the requirement directly regulated speech
rather than professional conduct. Id. at 2374.
121. Id. at 2372 (distinguishing the notice requirement from the purely factual and uncontroversial language of Zauderer).
122. Id. at 2378.
123. Id. at 2377.
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was licensed.124 Next, the Court opined that because the requirement that the notice be prominently included in all print and
digital advertisements in as many languages as California
deemed necessary was unduly burdensome because it effectively
drowned out the speaker’s message.125
In essence, Justice Thomas’s majority opinion requires that
a compelled commercial disclosure requirement pass a series of
separate tests in order to qualify for Zauderer deference. First,
the disclosure must be (a) of purely factual information, (b) about
the terms under which the commercial actor will provide service,
and (c) not be about a controversial topic.126 By way of example,
Justice Thomas reasoned that the licensed notice requirement in
NIFLA failed the first test because it was about services offered
by the state, not the speaker—thus failing (b)—and because the
underlying topic of abortion was controversial.127 In particular,
this decision interpreting “uncontroversial” as applying to the
topic underlying the message rather than its factual veracity
represents a seismic shift from prior interpretations of the
“purely factual and uncontroversial” test.
Second, if a compelled commercial disclosure survives the
first part of the test, it is permissible only if it is not unjustified
and unduly burdensome.128 While the licensed notice requirement failed to survive the first part of Thomas’s version of the
Zauderer test,129 the unlicensed notice requirement seems to
have passed it, primarily because Thomas proceeded straight to
the “unjustified or unduly burdensome” prong of the test in considering it.130 The nature of the unlicensed notice requirement
supports this inference, as the required notice was a factual
statement about what services the facilities could provide and
did not refer to abortion.131 Thomas concluded that the unlicensed notice requirement failed this prong, largely relying on
(somewhat contrived) divides between the scope of the notice and
the cited justification, and the burden of forcing unwanted

124. Id. at 2377–78.
125. Id. at 2378.
126. See id. at 2372.
127. Id. Justice Thomas did not address the factuality of the licensed notice
requirement, likely because he deemed it to unnecessary to do so. See id.
128. See id. at 2377.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 2377.
131. See id. at 2369–70.
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speech on speakers.132 It seems unlikely that the licensed notice
requirement would survive Justice Thomas’s interpretation of
the second prong. Requiring a CPC to post information about
how to get an abortion would likely constitute an undue burden
on the CPC’s speech based on Thomas’s characterization of the
unlicensed notice requirement as being unduly burdensome.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Gorsuch, wrote a separate concurrence regarding
what he believed to be the viewpoint discrimination133 inherent
to the FACT Act.134 Kennedy viewed the FACT Act as forcing a
particular group of speakers—CPCs and the abortion opponents
behind them—to speak the government’s message regarding
abortion.135 In his eyes, doing so forced “individuals to contradict
their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts, or all of these.”136 Because
the FACT Act in practice targeted CPCs and the official legislative history of the Act seemed to espouse pro-choice ideology,
Kennedy decided that the Act was problematic due to viewpoint
discrimination, in addition to the reasoning found in Justice
Thomas’s majority opinion.137

132. Id. at 2375–76.
133. As an aside, it is worth noting that viewpoint discrimination is a particularly nebulous concept in practice, even among the numerous imprecise aspects of First Amendment doctrine. Indeed, despite the immense theoretical justification for a doctrine preventing against discrimination between and against
particular viewpoints, the practical application of the doctrine leaves much to
be desired in large part because it is easily manipulable: there is evidence to
suggest that applications of the doctrine are often outcome driven and, at least
in part, a function of the viewpoints held by individual judges. See James Weinstein, Free Speech, Abortion Access, and the Problem of Judicial Viewpoint Discrimination, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 474–77 (1996) (noting the differing invocations of the doctrine in two protest cases that were highly similar factually
but involved different judicial viewpoints). This problem seems to be exemplified by the differing treatments of the two highly similar abortion cases, NIFLA
and Casey: although the facts in each were only modestly different, the conservative majority in each case only mentioned viewpoint discrimination when
the act in question was motivated by pro-choice, rather than pro-life, concerns.
See supra notes 119–20. See generally Weinstein, supra (discussing the context
of the abortion debate as one that could be particularly problematic for the intrusion of judicial bias into determinations of viewpoint discrimination).
134. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.

2019]

THE DEMISE OF ZAUDERER

577

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan vigorously dissented, noting with distaste the wide-reaching negative impacts the majority ruling would have for disclosure regimes.138 The dissenters sharply criticized the majority’s
characterization of the FACT Act as content-based.139 The dissenters argued that deeming regulations to be content-based in
this way threatens a host of consumer protection regulations and
“virtually every disclosure law” in a way that has been unparalleled since Lochner v. New York was good law.140 In Lochner, the
Supreme Court struck down a New York law designed to protect
against horrific working conditions in bakeries by concluding
that the Fourteenth Amendment created a fundamental right to
freely contract, regardless of the consequences.141 The decision
in Lochner crippled labor laws for decades and is widely condemned as one of the Supreme Court’s worst decisions, both with
respect to legal reasoning and outcome.142 After finishing its
analysis of the potential for the majority’s reasoning to be a new
Lochner, the dissent applied both Casey and Zauderer to the
FACT Act. First, the dissent in effect stressed the similarities
between the disclosures in Casey and the FACT Act, while rejecting the majority’s assertion that the two were so dissimilar
as to preclude application of Casey.143
After concluding its analysis of the FACT Act under Casey,
the dissent argued that the majority’s application of Zauderer to
138. Id. at 2380–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s rationale jeopardized the continued viability of virtually any disclosure law).
139. See supra note 118 and discussion therein; see also NIFLA, 138 S. Ct.
at 2380–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the FACT Act is erroneously
considered “content-based” by the majority, and thus the majority erroneously
applies heightened scrutiny).
140. Id. Lochner v. New York was widely disparaged for its hamstringing of
labor protection regulations and effectively overruled since. Id. at 2381; see also
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding that a New York state
statute setting maximum working hours was unconstitutional because it infringed upon the freedom of contract).
141. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
142. Joshua Waimberg, Lochner v. New York: Fundamental Rights and Economic Liberty, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (Oct. 26, 2015), https://
constitutioncenter.org/blog/lochner-v-new-york-fundamental-rights-and
-economic-liberty [https://perma.cc/UJ2Q-L2CN] (discussing the legacy of the
Lochner decision).
143. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct at 2380–87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I find it impossible to drive any meaningful legal wedge between the law, as interpreted in Casey, and the law as it should be applied in this case.”). The dissent reasoned that
both cases involved medical matters and some type of informed consent. Id.
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the FACT Act was also flawed.144 First, Justice Breyer opined
that licensed disclosure requirements did in fact relate to the
services those consumers provided: by providing information
about state resources offering the same services, which would
allow the patient to make an informed choice as to which services
to use.145 Second, Breyer asserted that even if the disclosure
were not related to the services provided by CPCs, Zauderer does
not require such a relationship.146 Third, Breyer rejected the majority’s interpretation of the disclosure as controversial because
of the general controversiality of abortion, noting that the actual
information contained in the disclosure was purely factual and
not normative.147 Fourth, Breyer argued that the majority’s approach results in unequal treatment under the law for pro-choice
and anti-abortion groups.148 Breyer’s dissent also investigated
the absence of consideration of viewpoint discrimination by the
majority.149 Finally, the dissent examined the unlicensed disclosure requirement, rejecting the majority’s conclusion that the
state interest was purely hypothetical and that the requirement
was unduly burdensome.150
II. THE “PURELY FACTUAL AND UNCONTROVERSIAL”
STANDARD IS DEEPLY FLAWED
Nearly thirty-five years after Zauderer, it is still unclear
when commercial disclosure requirements receive Zauderer deference. Courts prior to NIFLA differed widely in their interpretations of Zauderer.151 Similarly, the piecemeal implementation

144. See id. at 2386–88.
145. Id. at 2387.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2388 (“Abortion is a controversial topic and a source of normative
debate, but the availability of state resources is not a normative statement or a
fact of debatable truth. The disclosure includes information about resources
available should a woman seek to continue her pregnancy or terminate it, and
it expresses no official preference for one choice over the other.”). While not doing so explicitly, Justice Breyer takes an approach to controversiality that recognizes that something cannot be purely factual and also be controversial. See
id.
148. Id. (noting the differential treatment of First Amendment rights of antiabortion medical service providers in NIFLA as opposed to pro-choice medical
service providers in Casey).
149. Id. at 2388–89.
150. Id. at 2389–92.
151. See supra Part I.C.3.
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of the “purely factual and uncontroversial” language from Zauderer as a threshold requirement led to confusing jurisdictional
splits regarding the new standard.152 As confusing and problematic as Zauderer doctrine was prior to NIFLA, however, the majority opinion in NIFLA made it far worse. This Part focuses on
the seismic shift in how the “uncontroversial” prong of the
“purely factual and uncontroversial” standard is apparently to
be considered that the NIFLA majority implements.153
This Part demonstrates that the doctrine governing when
and how Zauderer deference should be granted needs fundamental revision for three main reasons. Section A argues that Zauderer was unclear, leaving open an interpretive vacuum. Courts
attempted to fill this vacuum, but created an even more tortured
and confusing body of law. Thus, Section A shows that even before NIFLA, clarification as to when Zauderer applied was necessary. Sections B and C demonstrate that NIFLA was not the
clarifying change shown necessary by Section A. Section B argues that the NIFLA majority’s interpretation of the “uncontroversial” prong is problematic due to the disturbing inherent subjectivity of determining which topics are controversial, allowing
judges’ personal opinions to operate as factual determinations.
Section C asserts that the NIFLA majority’s interpretation of the
“uncontroversial” prong is concerning because it undermines the
consumer protection interests at the heart of both Zauderer and
the Court’s entire commercial speech jurisprudence. Section D
briefly rebuts counterarguments to Sections A, B, and C.
A. THE PURELY FACTUAL AND UNCONTROVERSIAL STANDARD
WAS PROBLEMATIC PRIOR TO NIFLA
Even before NIFLA, it was unclear when compelled commercial disclosures would receive Zauderer deference. As it was
gradually implemented, the “purely factual and uncontroversial”
standard was particularly confusing, with numerous different
interpretations of the standard and when it was to be applied.154

152. See supra Part I.C.3; see also infra Part II.A.2 (giving background on
how courts interpret the Zauderer standard).
153. See supra notes 121, 126–31 and accompanying text.
154. See Lyle Denniston, After Three Decades, Does Zauderer Need Updating?, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 18, 2014, 5:28PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/
11/after-three-decades-does-zauderer-need-updating/ [https://perma.cc/5R4U
-TLXR]; see also supra Part I.C.3 (outlining the varied interpretations of Zauderer pre-NIFLA).
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First, this Section notes Zauderer was unclear as to which compelled commercial disclosure requirements receive Zauderer deference. Next, this Section describes how the rise of the “purely
factual and uncontroversial” threshold requirement exacerbated
the confusion surrounding Zauderer. Ultimately, this Section
demonstrates that the question of when to implement Zauderer
deference needs fundamental reconsideration.
1. Zauderer Failed to Create a Clear Template for How to
Apply the New Level of Deference It Created
Zauderer was unclear as to exactly how to evaluate commercial disclosure requirements.155 The Zauderer Court only noted
that the regulation at issue had “attempted only to prescribe
what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising” in the form of
requiring the inclusion of “purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will be available[,]” and that the speaker had a minimal constitutionally protected interest in not disclosing that information except to the
extent the disclosure requirement was “unjustified or unduly
burdensome.”156 While the language of Zauderer seems to suggest the Court intended compelled commercial disclosure requirements to be evaluated on the basis of whether they were
reasonably related to state interests in preventing consumer deception and whether they were unjustified or unduly burdensome, this interpretation is hardly conclusive.157 In addition, it
is not clear that the Zauderer Court intended the “purely factual
and uncontroversial” standard to be a prerequisite standard for
Zauderer scrutiny.158 In brief, Zauderer is not entirely clear as
to when Zauderer deference should be applied, but does seem to
suggest that the “purely factual and uncontroversial” language
should not have been implemented as a standard.
2. Purely Factual and Uncontroversial: One New Standard,
Two Confusing and Problematic Prongs
Despite the apparent views of the Zauderer Court discussed
above, much of the subsequent case law has invoked Zauderer’s
“purely factual and uncontroversial” language as a prerequisite

155.
156.
157.
158.

See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
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to applying Zauderer.159 As a result of this trend, courts grappled
with how to implement the new “standard.”160 While the “standard” is recited as a unit, decisions following Zauderer turned it
into two separate requirements—a disclosure requirement must
be both (1) purely factual and (2) uncontroversial.161 These decisions reached different conclusions as to the meaning of both
prongs of the standard.162 In effect, the piecemeal development
of the new standard led to confusing implementations, as various
courts struck down a variety of disclosure requirements for failing to meet one prong or the other of the new standard.
The “purely factual” prong has been engaged with extensively, particularly in the context of compelled image “disclosures.” The Sixth Circuit upheld graphic cigarette label warnings alongside textual warnings under Zauderer because the
textual warnings were factual and accurate even if the graphics
were nonliteral and emotionally provocative.163 In a separate
opinion, the Court noted that facts, including those presented
graphically, could “disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional
response, spark controversy, and even overwhelm reason, but
that does not magically turn such facts into opinions.”164 While
many scholars agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion,165 the
D.C. Circuit refused to apply Zauderer scrutiny to graphic cigarette warning labels, finding that they were not purely factual
because they were primarily intended to evoke an emotional response.166 Other courts have differentiated what is “purely factual” from what is subjective or opinion-based. Several circuits
159. See, e.g., Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Sch. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d
173, 206 (D. Mass. 2016).
160. See infra notes 163–73 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 163–73 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 163–73 and accompanying text.
163. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 524–
27, 559, 569 (6th Cir. 2012).
164. Id. at 569 (Stranch, J., separate opinion).
165. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Emotional Compelled Disclosures, 127
HARV. L. REV. F. 357, 361 (2014); Rebecca Tushnet, More than a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2392, 2406–07 (2014).
166. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1209–22 (D.C. Cir.
2012), overruled by AMI, 760 F.3d 18 (2014) (en banc). Some writers have described Reynolds’ approach as ironic, noting that the informative power of disclosures increases as they evoke emotions, particularly important are the potential consequences of failing to ignore health warnings in the smoking context.
See, e.g., Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the
Constitutional Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 537–
38 (2014); see also R. George Wright, Are There First Amendment “Vacuums”:
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declined to find mandated disclosure labels to be purely factual,
despite explicit statutory definitions of the label content, where
the statutory definition itself was subjective.167 While this particular approach is less confusing than its counterpart discussed
above, the “purely factual” prong as a whole is still mired in confusion, which may be further exacerbated going forward by the
rise of alternative facts.168
Despite the differing interpretations of the “purely factual”
prong of the Zauderer standard discussed above, the “uncontroversial” prong prior to NIFLA was mired in even more controversy.169 Several circuits arrived at dramatically different conclusions regarding the meaning of uncontroversial. First, courts
in the Ninth Circuit interpreted “uncontroversial” as being effectively the same as “purely factual,” meaning that the facts themselves are truthful.170 Conversely, the D.C. Circuit explicitly

The Case of the Free Speech Challenge to Tobacco Package Labeling Requirements, 76 ALB. L. REV. 613, 625 (2012) (noting that some points may need to be
made in an “inflammatory” fashion in order to be effective). Others, however,
have written in apparent support of the Reynolds approach, noting that fearbased appeals such as the graphic warning labels are in essence conveying a
normative message from the government discouraging use of the product in
question rather than purely factual information intended to help consumers decide for themselves whether to use a product. See Jennifer M. Keighley, Can
You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 578–85 (2012). For a general discussion critiquing the Reynolds majority’s approach to images, see Peter Bozzo, The
Treachery of Images: Reinterpreting Compelled Commercial-Speech Doctrine, 66
DEPAUL L. REV. 965 (2017).
167. See, e.g., NAM II, 800 F.3d 518, 529–30 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting NAM,
748 F.3d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2014)) (holding that a statutory definition of “conflict free” with respect to imported minerals was “hardly ‘factual and non-ideological’”). Other circuits have implemented similar reasoning with respect to labels affixed to video game packaging in accordance with state definitions of
material that they deemed inappropriate for children under the age of 18 (both
circuits deemed the statutory definition to be too subjective to be purely factual).
See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 965–67 (9th
Cir. 2009); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir.
2006).
168. See Leading Cases: NIFLA supra note 69, at 353 (noting that even “scientific or historical facts [have] become controversial”).
169. See AMI, 760 F.3d at 34 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“[I]t is unclear how [courts] should assess . . . whether a mandatory disclosure
is controversial.”).
170. CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1117–18
(9th Cir. 2017) (declaring that ‘“uncontroversial’ in this context refers to the
factual accuracy of the compelled disclosure, not to its subjective impact on the
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noted that “uncontroversial” must mean something other than
“purely factual.”171 In AMI, controversial was defined as something that “communicates a message that is controversial for
some reason other than dispute about simple factual accuracy.”172 This conception of “uncontroversial” as something different than “purely factual” was reiterated in NAM, with the
Court declaring that the two prongs must have some separate
meaning.173 In brief, courts prior to NIFLA disagreed on what
“uncontroversial” meant.
In conclusion, it is readily apparent that Zauderer deference—specifically the question of when and how it is to be applied—needs fundamental reconsideration. Zauderer was unclear as to when commercial disclosure requirements receive
deference,174 but the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard that arose in the interpretive vacuum left by Zauderer is far
more confusing and inconsistent.175 Thus, courts need to consider updating the doctrine.

audience.”). The Ninth Circuit implemented this interpretation again in American Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, finding that a disclosure
regarding the health risks of sugary beverages was controversial because of the
contested accuracy of the facts in the disclosure. 871 F.3d 884, 892–93, 895 (9th
Cir. 2017), rev’d en banc, 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019); see also infra note 182
(explaining the en banc holding). Some authors have supported this interpretation. See Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 236–37 (2011) (“[W]hether the fact is controverted . . . asks whether there is disagreement over the fact’s truth, not
whether there is disagreement over disclosing the fact.”). But see Repackaging
Zauderer, supra note 93, at 984 n.73 (characterizing this approach as a “relatively banal understanding” of Zauderer). However, some other courts, including some in the D.C. Circuit, seem to also subscribe to this interpretation, at
least partially. See infra note 173.
171. See AMI, 760 F.3d at 23, 27; see also NAM II, 800 F.3d at 528–29 (conducting an analysis based on the assumption that “uncontroversial” and “purely
factual” have different meanings).
172. AMI, 760 F.3d at 27.
173. NAM II, 800 F.3d at 528–29 (defining “controversy” as “a dispute, especially a public one”). It is worth noting that Reynolds also put forth a definition
of “controversial,” declaring a disclosure to be controversial when it would be
“subject to misinterpretation by consumers.” Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217, overruled by AMI, 760 F.3d at 18.
174. See supra Part II.A.1.
175. See supra notes 159–73 and accompanying text.
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B. NIFLA’S VERSION OF THE “UNCONTROVERSIAL” PRONG
RENDERS IT IMPERMISSIBLY PRONE TO SUBSTITUTIONS OF
JUDICIAL OPINION FOR FACT
The “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard was unclear before NIFLA,176 but the majority opinion in NIFLA made
it worse. There can be little doubt that both the notices in NIFLA
were purely factual.177 The FACT Act merely stated the services
that the state provided for low-income women.178 However, Justice Thomas and the majority ignored the factuality of the disclosures and implemented an interpretation of the “uncontroversial” prong of the Zauderer standard that no circuit court (and
few district courts) had even considered.179 Rather than determining controversiality based on the information in the disclosure, the majority instead focused on the controversiality of the
underlying topic—abortion.180 Even before NIFLA, writers noted
that the “uncontroversial” prong of the Zauderer standard left
open an uncomfortably large window for the subjective beliefs of
judges to influence their decision making.181 Following the NIFLA decision, that window is opened even further.182 Judges now
176. See supra Part II.A.2.
177. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368–70 (2018).
178. See Leading Cases: NIFLA supra note 69, at 353.
179. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
180. Id. It is worth noting that NIFLA is not the first decision to approach
the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard in this way. See Evergreen
Ass’n Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 245 n.6 (2d Cir. 2014). This approach is in marked contrast to that of a court hearing a challenge to a GMO
labeling requirement in Vermont. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp.
3d 583, 628–29 (D. Vt. 2015) (noting that the compelled information must itself
be controversial). On appeal, the plaintiffs argued the requirement failed Zauderer because the topic of GMOs was controversial, but the appeal was never
heard. See Nigel Barrella, First Amendment Limits on Compulsory Labeling, 71
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 519, 534 (2016).
181. See Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 989.
182. Given that NIFLA’s recency has given little time for many examples of
this to develop, perhaps the best example to develop thus far comes from an en
banc rehearing of American Beverage Ass’n v. City and Cty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749
(9th Cir. 2019) (en banc). See also supra note 170 (providing background information on the case). The majority rejected the notice regarding the health risks
of sugary foods and drinks as being unduly burdensome because the notice was
required to take up 20% of the space of the advertisement. Am. Beverage, 916
F.3d at 757. In a separate concurrence, however, Judge Ikuta argued that the
notice was not permissible under Zauderer because the health risks of sugar
were a controversial topic. See id. at 761 (Ikuta, J., concurring). Although this
determination was not entirely outlandish (namely because statements by the
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not only have the leeway to interpret whether a message itself is
controversial under the “purely factual and uncontroversial”
standard, but also which topics are controversial.183 This Section
argues that the alarming potential for the replacement of fact
with opinion in deciding what topics are permissible under the
“uncontroversial” prong mandates a fundamental reconsideration and revision of Zauderer deference and its application postNIFLA.
The NIFLA majority’s new approach to the “uncontroversial” prong poses a grave threat to the commercial disclosure regime. Increasing partisanship and politicization of facts could
render virtually any topic controversial, precluding Zauderer
deference.184 For instance, take the commercial disclosure requirements in Section C.1 of Part I.185 should attorneys be forced
to disclose in advertisements that clients may have to pay otherwise undisclosed costs?186 Those with heated opinions on lawyers
and legal billing would find the underlying topic controversial.
Similarly, if one subscribes to laissez faire economics, such a requirement could be controversial because the underlying topic—
regulation—is controversial. Should meat packages be required
to bear country of origin labels?187 The debate over domestic production and globalization is controversial to many. Alternatively, what if a pro-choice court heard a case with a disclosure
requirement similar to that in Casey188 but in a commercial
speech context that would put it within Zauderer’s purview?
That court could easily reject such a requirement under the NIFLA majority’s interpretation of “uncontroversial” as applying to
FDA indicated that sugar consumption was safe at certain levels), generally accepted norms suggest that the idea of health risks posed by added sugars is far
from controversial. See id.; see also Goodman, supra note 166, at 553 (noting
that reducing sugar is almost universally perceived as a positive health benefit).
While this is not nearly as bad an example of substituting a judicial opinion
regarding the controversiality of a topic, it is the closest actual example given
the recency of NIFLA. Still, given the only slight deviations in severity between
the FDA statements and the required notice, rejecting the requirement on controversiality grounds seems to fit within the dangers of the NIFLA approach
discussed above.
183. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372; Am. Beverage, 916 F.3d at 749.
184. See Leading Cases: NIFLA supra note 69, at 353.
185. See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
186. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 625, 636, 650–
53 (1985).
187. See AMI, 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
188. See supra note 119 (providing a discussion and brief analysis of the facts
in Casey).
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the underlying topic because curtailing a woman’s right to abortion is almost certainly as controversial as abortion generally.
Even the topic of compelled commercial speech generally could
be deemed highly controversial.189 Perhaps most importantly,
even scientifically verifiable information—such as climate science—could be controversial because some small subset of the
population disagrees with it. Thus, the potential for the subjective beliefs of judges to dictate what topics are controversial jeopardizes the commercial disclosure regime and mandates revision
of the Zauderer doctrine.
C. NIFLA’S VERSION OF THE “UNCONTROVERSIAL” PRONG
UNDERMINES CONSUMER PROTECTION INTERESTS
Zauderer and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy recognize
that commercial speech derives its value from its ability to inform consumers by helping them make informed decisions and
forcing speakers to provide additional information when their
message is otherwise misleading.190 This Section demonstrates
that the NIFLA majority’s interpretation of the “uncontroversial” prong undermines consumer interests by affording commercial speakers with a level of protection that prior precedent does
not justify.
First, obstacles reducing the flow of information to consumers almost always reduce their ability to make informed decisions. By interpreting the meaning of the “uncontroversial”
prong so broadly,191 the NIFLA majority created a precedent
which dramatically reduces the number of viable compelled commercial disclosure regulations and thus the flow of information
to consumers. Since commercial speech directly derives its value
from its ability to inform consumers, altering the requirements
for Zauderer deference directly undermines that value.
Second, the consumer interest in information about products or services pertaining to a controversial underlying topic is
even greater than normal. This seems self-evident: consumers
put more thought and research into decisions that are more
costly or otherwise worth more to them. This is why, for most
189. See, e.g., Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 14, Nationwide Biweekly Admin. v. Hubanks, No. 17-1161 (Mar.
21, 2018).
190. See supra notes 40–41, 76–81 and accompanying text.
191. See supra Part II.B. The NIFLA Court’s interpretation of the “uncontroversial” prong was broad because it effectively rendered any disclosure to be
controversial, since virtually any underlying topic can be controversial.
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consumers, deciding which car to buy requires significantly more
thought and information than deciding which napkins to buy.
Take, for instance, the debate surrounding GMOs. Many consumers desire the labels of their food products to provide them
with information about whether the product includes GMO ingredients precisely because GMOs are a matter of some controversy.192 Similarly, although climate change is also quite likely
a controversial topic, many consumers are particularly interested in the fuel efficiency of their cars precisely because they
desire to know the car’s environmental impact. In sum, consumers rely on information the most when they are forced to make a
decision regarding a controversial topic.
D. THE NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTROVERSIALITY
STANDARD IS NOT NECESSARY TO PROTECT RELIGIOUS OR
MISSION-DRIVEN COMMERCIAL SPEAKERS
In Zauderer, the Court explicitly stated that a commercial
speaker had a minimal interest in not saying or disclosing factual information.193 What if, for one reason or another, a commercial speaker did have some heightened interest in non-disclosure? There is a plausible argument to be made that speakers
that are religious or are otherwise mission-driven have a higher
interest than the average advertiser or commercial speaker. For
instance, Justice Kennedy’s NIFLA concurrence implicitly seems
to suggest that the anti-abortion advocates in NIFLA—but potentially also other faith-based advocates outside of the abortion
context—had a particularly high interest in non-disclosure.194
Even accepting this premise, there remains the question of what
types of mission-driven speakers could argue such a heightened
interest in non-disclosure. For example, physicians are missiondriven: their mission is to provide scientifically validated treatment and counsel that adheres to strict standards of care.195 As
192. Disclosure requirements regarding GMOs have already been challenged and upheld. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583,
628–29 (D. Vt. 2015).
193. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985);
see also supra Part I.C.3 (explaining the reduced free speech protections provided to commercial disclosures under Zauderer).
194. Kennedy noted that the FACT Act forced “individuals to contradict
their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical, ethical,
or religious precepts . . . [.]” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). From this perspective, CPCs may have a higher interest in nondisclosure than other commercial speakers. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650–53.
195. See Bryant & Swartz, supra note 104, at 271.
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persuasive as the argument of the potential for a commercial
speaker’s heightened interest in non-disclosure may be—especially if one regards religiously motivated speakers in a special
light—it is no justification for interpreting the “uncontroversial”
prong so broadly as to jeopardize disclosure requirements whenever the speaker can contrive an argument for a controversial
topic.
Instead, religious or mission-driven speakers can be protected by other aspects of commercial speech jurisprudence. Zauderer itself provides a better option for protection than the new
interpretation of the “uncontroversial” prong. Arguably, requiring a speaker to make a commercial disclosure with a message
to which it is diametrically opposed is an undue burden.196 Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s portrayal of the hardships CPC operators faced due to the FACT Act credibly suggests an undue burden.197
In addition, the Court has already recognized that where
commercial speech is inextricably intertwined with fully protected speech (such as advocacy for mission-driven charities),
both the commercial and fully protected speech are reviewed under strict scrutiny as any content-based curtailment of entirely
fully protected speech would be.198 Thus, in NIFLA for instance,
regulation of an advertisement for an unlicensed facility attempting to draw women to the CPC but also advocating against
abortion in some inextricable way would be subject to strict scrutiny even without the NIFLA majority’s interpretation of the
“uncontroversial prong.”
III. THE ROAD AHEAD: SOLUTIONS FOR ZAUDERER
DEFERENCE POST-NIFLA
As established in the previous part, the question of when
and how Zauderer deference should be applied is fraught and
problematic, largely because Zauderer did not clarify how subsequent courts should apply the doctrine it created. Any modifications to the standard going forward must take into account three
primary concerns in order to effectively revitalize and clarify the
doctrine.199 First, a good solution must mitigate the linguistic incoherence and lack of clarity inherent to Zauderer deference
196.
197.
198.
199.

See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
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prior to NIFLA. Second, any solution must correct the way in
which the NIFLA majority rewrote the “uncontroversial” prong
to be ripe for exploitation by judicial bias. Third, such a solution
must remedy the fundamental divorce from the consumer protection and information interests at the very core of all commercial speech doctrine since Virginia State Board of Pharmacy that
the NIFLA majority perpetuated.200 This part argues that wiping the Zauderer slate clean—and returning to the “unduly burdensome” test that the Zauderer Court arguably intended—is
the best way to address all three of those concerns.
A. WIPING THE ZAUDERER SLATE CLEAN: WHY THE SUPREME
COURT SHOULD RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL TEST ARGUABLY
POSED BY ZAUDERER
First, the best option would likely be for the Supreme Court
to overrule much of the post-Zauderer jurisprudence of the last
roughly thirty-five years and start anew with a clean slate and
a clarification and revitalization of the original Zauderer test. As
discussed above, it seems unlikely that the Zauderer Court intended the “purely factual and uncontroversial language” in its
opinion to be more than a characterization of a sufficient set of
facts to justify the use of deferential Zauderer scrutiny.201 The
fact that the Court in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United
States declined to use the standard as a threshold requirement,
or even repeat the language less than ten years ago suggests this
is still a viable option despite the NIFLA holding.202 Instead, the
“unjustified or unduly burdensome” language of Zauderer could
replace the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard as
used in NIFLA.203 Indeed, this seems to be the approach that the
200. See supra notes 33–41 and accompanying text.
201. See supra Part II.A.1.
202. See Milavetz, Gallop, and Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229,
249–51 (2010).
203. This Section focuses exclusively on the “unduly burdensome” prong of
the “unjustified or unduly burdensome” standard for several reasons (including
brevity). First, this Section seeks to analyze the “unduly burdensome” prong in
particular as a substitute for what the NIFLA Court seemed to be trying to accomplish through its new understanding of “uncontroversial.” See NIFLA, 138
S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018). Second, scholars have suggested that the “unjustified”
prong—sometimes considered as a requirement that a disclosure requirement
be “rationally related” to a permissible government interest—is more permissive than the second prong, reducing its efficacy in accomplishing the apparent
goals of the NIFLA majority. See Nat Stern & Mark Joseph Stern, Advancing
an Adaptive Standard of Strict Scrutiny for Content-Based Commercial Speech
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Zauderer Court took in analyzing the facts before it.204 This section briefly considers how courts have implemented the “unjustified or unduly burdensome” test before arguing that a slightly
more expansive version of the “unduly burdensome” prong could
achieve the apparent goal of the NIFLA majority in approaching
controversiality at the topic level while also addressing the concerns about the NIFLA approach raised in Part II.
1. Courts So Far Have Primarily Found Disclosures “Unduly
Burdensome” Under Zauderer Due to Size
Thus far, courts have invoked the “unduly burdensome” test
largely when striking down mandated disclosures based on their
size. In NIFLA, for instance, the majority reasoned that the unlicensed notice was unduly burdensome in part because it could
require a two word message—“Choose Life”—to be surrounded
by California’s required message under the FACT Act in as many
as thirteen different languages.205 Similarly, in an en banc rehearing of American Beverage Ass’n v. City and County of San
Francisco before the Ninth Circuit, the majority reasoned that
the disclosure requirement at issue was unjustified and unduly
burdensome in part because expert testimony showed that similar warnings had demanded a significantly smaller percentage
of space of the total advertisement.206 Numerous other cases
have also followed this approach.207
At the heart of this effectively size-based approach is a reliance on the same consumer protection justifications the Supreme Court cited in both Virginia State Board of Pharmacy208
Regulation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1171, 1189 (2013) (“A compelled disclosure that
is reasonably related to preventing deception can hardly be unjustified, and so
scrutiny should be focused on its burden.”); see also Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 989 (highlighting a set of cases that suggest a disclosure must
be “rationally related” to the government interest, otherwise it poses an “undue
burden” on the commercial speaker).
204. See supra notes 85–89.
205. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2378; see also supra Part I.D (summarizing NIFLA’s holding and impact).
206. 916 F.3d 749, 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc); see also supra note 168
(providing background information on the case).
207. See, e.g., Ibanez v. Florida Dep’t of Bus. and Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S.
136, 146–47 (1994); see also Rebecca Tushnet, COOL Story: Country of Origin
Labeling and the First Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 25, 31 (2015) (detailing why the Country of Origin Law was not an undue burden because of its high
government interest); Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 989–93.
208. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
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and Zauderer:209 protections for commercial speech and disclosure requirements on commercial speech are both justified because they increase vital flows of information to consumers. In
cases rejecting disclosures as unduly burdensome based on size,
courts have made the rational assumption that excessively long
disclosures have a high risk of “effectively rul[ing] out” certain
types of speech, thus decreasing the flow of information to consumers.210 Because such disclosure requirements impermissibly
intrude upon the flow of information to consumers rather than
supplementing it, they do not receive Zauderer deference under
this approach.
Before moving on to the changes to the “unduly burdensome” standard that this Note suggests, however, it is worth noting that a simple substitution of the size-focused version of the
“unduly burdensome standard” for the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard would at the very least mitigate, if not
remove entirely, the issues raised in Part II. First, although the
Zauderer Court did not specifically address what an “unduly burdensome” disclosure requirement might be,211 there has been no
subsequent piecemeal development of the standard in divergent
and confusing directions.212 This lack of divergent interpretations, coupled with the fact that it is far easier to determine the
size of a disclosure relative to the speech it accompanies than it
is to determine the controversiality of a disclosure, renders this
version of the standard far less confusing. Second, this version
of the standard permits very little room for judicial bias. If the
metric is truly one of how much space a mandated disclosure
would take up, or whether some similar consideration would effectively rule out some types of speech, there is much less leeway
for a judge to decide based on bias than there is in deciding

209. See supra Part I.C.2.
210. See Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146 (reasoning that a requirement that specialists disclose a great deal of information regarding their specialist designation
“effectively rule[d] out notation of the ‘specialist’ designation on a business card
or letterhead, or in a yellow pages listing”); see also Robert Post, Lecture, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 900 (2015) (noting that unduly burdensome disclosure requirements can chill the flow of information to
consumers in a manner that is inconsistent with the primary justifications for
commercial speech doctrine).
211. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
212. Cf. supra Part II.A (explaining why the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard is problematic in general).
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whether the underlying topic is controversial.213 Finally, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, this approach is aligned with
the consumer protection and information interests at the heart
of commercial speech doctrine, and does not need wholesale reconsideration and revision in order to address these concerns.214
2. A More Expansive Interpretation of the “Unduly
Burdensome” Test Could Be the Best Path Forward for
Zauderer Deference Post-NIFLA
While interpreting the “unduly burdensome” standard
simply as a limit on the size of disclosures has its advantages,
implementing a more expansive interpretation represents the
best path forward for protecting commercial disclosure regimes
post-NIFLA.215 At first glance, it might seem counterintuitive to
suggest that effectively raising the bar that a disclosure requirement must clear is a good option for protecting disclosure requirements. However, courts of late have begun to interpret the
First Amendment in ways that show an increasing solicitude for
commercial speakers, particularly where speakers have certain
religious or political views.216 Because of this trend, the best
likely approach of implementing the “unduly burdensome”
standard in place of the “purely factual and uncontroversial”
standard is simply to strike a middle course: articulate a version
of the “unduly burdensome” standard that gives courts some leeway to strike down disclosure requirements that are unduly burdensome for reasons beyond the size of the disclosure, but still
protects commercial disclosure regimes from the broad version
of the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard articulated
in NIFLA.

213. See supra Part II.B.
214. Cf. supra Part II.C (outlining why NIFLA’s interpretation of the purely
factual and uncontroversial standard undermines consumer protections).
215. For the sake of clarity, interpreting the standard more expansively—as
this subsection suggests—would still be inclusive of the sizing considerations
discussed in Part III.A.1.
216. See generally NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368–78 (2018) (finding that the
FACT Act disclosure was content-based, and subject to strict scrutiny under the
First Amendment); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (holding that a cake shop owner can refuse to make a
cake for a same sex wedding); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (allowing corporations to advocate directly for their political preferences).
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This approach has several key merits. First, it mitigates
concerns regarding the overexpansion of Zauderer scrutiny217
without also jeopardizing otherwise meritorious and purely factual disclosure requirements due to subjective interpretations of
controversy. For instance, disclosures requiring a commercial
speaker to guide consumers to a competing business218 or state
service could be unduly burdensome,219 while still protecting, for
example, requirements that casinos include information on how
to get help for gambling addictions in their advertisements.220
This approach could also protect commercial speakers motivated
by religious or mission-based concerns rather than just profit.221
Intuitively, it does make sense that forcing a deeply religious individual who happens to be a commercial speaker in one context
to convey a message that directly controverts her faith is far
more burdensome than requiring a restaurant to disclose the caloric content of its foods.222 In essence, by providing courts with
an avenue to strike down disclosure requirements that may have
been deemed controversial under the broad “uncontroversial”
standard in the past—but eliminating the incredibly problematic “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard—this approach limits the potential damage to commercial disclosure regimes that NIFLA and the “purely factual and uncontroversial”
standard pose.
While similar approaches were suggested even prior to NIFLA,223 the adoption of this approach is of particular importance
post-NIFLA.224 As discussed in Part II, the part of Zauderer doctrine that NIFLA most directly problematized was the use of the
“purely factual and uncontroversial” standard, particularly the
“uncontroversial” prong.225 Generally, the “purely factual and
217. See, e.g., Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae, supra note 189,
at 6–7 (arguing against the Zauderer majority opinion analysis).
218. See Safelite Grp., Inc. v. Jepsen, 764 F.3d 258, 264 (2d Cir. 2014).
219. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.
220. See Leading Cases: NIFLA supra note 69, at 354.
221. See supra Part II.D.
222. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, No. 08 Civ. 1000
(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008).
223. See Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 989.
224. This Note does not pretend to offer the only solution to the problems it
identifies, or to definitively outline the exact contours of the new, expanded version of the “unduly burdensome” test it proposes. Instead, this Note intends to
serve as the starting point to a debate over how to best shape the law going
forward.
225. See supra Part II.
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uncontroversial” standard was problematic for three primary
reasons: (1) the standard was poorly defined and confusing even
prior to NIFLA; (2) the NIFLA majority’s interpretation of the
“uncontroversial” prong rendered the standard particularly susceptible to impermissible judicial bias; and (3) interpreting the
“uncontroversial” prong to apply to the topic level effectively undermined the consumer protection interests at the heart of all
commercial speech doctrine.226 This approach significantly mitigates, if not removes, all of these problems.
First, this approach would eliminate the use of the “purely
factual and uncontroversial” language of Zauderer as a standard
entirely, which would be hugely beneficial. To begin with, the
standard and its prongs were developed piecemeal, leading to
confusing and irregular implementation and definition of the
test even prior to NIFLA.227 Although there were other jurisdictional differences in interpretations of when and how to apply
Zauderer deference prior to NIFLA,228 the majority of the differences focused on the implementation of the standard as a prerequisite to Zauderer deference, rather than on what constituted
an undue burden. In essence, this approach would eliminate the
confusion of when and how Zauderer deference applies caused
by the inconsistent and confusing “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard.
Second, this approach would not be plagued by judicial bias
to the same degree as the NIFLA majority’s approach for several
reasons. To begin, determining whether a disclosure requirement is unduly burdensome is a far narrower determination
than deciding whether the underlying topic of a disclosure is a
controversial, which essentially requires two incredibly subjective determinations: (1) what the underlying topic is; and (2)
whether the topic chosen is in fact controversial in the eyes of
the judge.229 By dramatically narrowing the scope of what questions must be decided by the judge, this approach significantly
mitigates concerns over judicial bias. In addition, in contrast to
the “uncontroversial” standard following NIFLA, there is already existing precedent across other bodies of law that can help
give indications of what an unduly burdensome requirement
might look like. For instance, the Supreme Court has used tests
of undue burden in the context of the dormant commerce clause
226.
227.
228.
229.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part I.C.3.
See infra Part III.B (noting the similarities between Casey and NIFLA).
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and access to abortion.230 While the contexts are not identical to
that of compelled commercial disclosures, the guiding factors
and general approach to the standard in each are sufficiently
analogous to give enough guidance to judges to greatly mitigate
concerns over bias, particularly in comparison to the “uncontroversial” standard.231 In conclusion, although room for judicial interpretation and thus bias remains, the dramatic narrowing of
the scope of the necessary determinations and analogous precedent interpreting similar standards significantly mitigates concerns over judicial bias.
Finally, this approach is consistent with the consumer protection interests underlying all commercial speech doctrine, unlike the “uncontroversial” standard following NIFLA.232 This is
largely due to the same rationales discussed above in precedent
implementing the narrower version of the unduly burdensome
test: a disclosure that is unduly burdensome effectively chills
speech, and thus runs contrary to consumer interests in information.233 In the same way that a mandated disclosure which
effectively rules out advertisements in a phone book or on business cards chills those kinds of speech, it seems reasonable to
conclude that a disclosure requirement which requires an antiabortion activist to share a message on abortion in direct opposition to his faith or a small-business owner to effectively advertise for her competitors could easily lead either of those parties
not to speak.234 In addition, because this approach is justifiable
in serving consumer interests, it does not require the same effective sublimation of consumer interests to those of commercial
speakers in not speaking on controversial topics that NIFLA
seems to require. Indeed, rather than requiring a recognition
that mission-driven speakers may have a heightened interest in
non-disclosure, this approach could achieve the same result
without shifting the focus of and justifications for commercial
speech doctrine.

230. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579–80 (1995); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. See supra Part II.C.
233. See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 217–22 and accompanying text.
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3. Addressing Counterarguments to Expanding the “Unduly
Burdensome” Test
There are, however, three primary counterarguments to this
approach. The first, already largely addressed in this section, argues that expanding the “unduly burdensome” standard renders
it subject to the same concerns over judicial bias as the “uncontroversial” standard following NIFLA. This Note does not intend
to suggest that there is any potential expansion of the “unduly
burdensome” standard which will not, to some degree, make the
standard more prone to judicial bias than it is as merely a size
restriction. Instead, this Note argues that this potential increase
is justified, but also narrower than some might think. First, as
discussed above, this approach seeks to be a middle ground that
protects the majority of commercial disclosure requirements by
granting courts some—albeit significantly narrower—avenues
to do what they were likely to do anyway. Second, the scope of
the determinations required (and thus the window for judicial
bias) is significantly narrower than one might think, and particularly so in comparison to the “uncontroversial” standard: determining whether a disclosure is “unduly burdensome” is a significantly narrower determination than deciding what the
underlying topic of a disclosure is and then whether that topic is
controversial.235 In addition, the window is further narrowed
when one considers this expansion as a mere extension of the
same rationales as used under the current version of the standard: a disclosure is unduly burdensome to the extent it will actually chill speech. Thus, concerns over judicial bias under this approach are largely overwrought and unwarranted.
Second, at the end of Part III.A.1, this Note argued that substituting the current version of the “unduly burdensome” standard as primarily a size restriction for the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard already mitigates the problems
addressed in Part II. If this is truly the case, then why expand
the standard in a way that could make it harder for disclosure
requirements to survive in court? This is a tough question to answer, and this Note recognizes the merits of the current approach. Rather this Note relies on the assumption that there
may be a different era in First Amendment doctrine right around

235. The narrowness of the determination matters for one simple reason: it
limits the scope of potential bias. For instance, imagine being asked to pick a
color. You have a much greater ability to pick your preferred color in this instance, than when being asked to pick a shade of blue.

2019]

THE DEMISE OF ZAUDERER

597

the corner—one which places greater value on the speaker’s interests in commercial speech and may represent a new Lochner
era236—and that the best way to protect commercial disclosures
may be to meet the new trend halfway. Although the current
state of the “unduly burdensome” standard may be the best for
commercial disclosures in the short term, if the standard is truly
to displace the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard, it
must grant courts leeway to accomplish some of the things they
could under the “uncontroversial” standard in order to mitigate
the temptation to articulate a wholly new standard which is even
more dangerous to commercial disclosure regimes.
Finally, the discerning reader by this point may have seized
upon one hitherto unaddressed argument: how can Zauderer deference truly move on from, and effectively remove the idea that
a disclosure must be “purely factual and uncontroversial” to receive Zauderer deference? The answer is simple: this approach
does not mandate banishing consideration of the phrase from all
subsequent cases. Instead, this approach recognizes that this
language from Zauderer is deeply problematic as a standard and
should thus not be a prerequisite to receiving Zauderer deference. By replacing the “purely factual and uncontroversial”
standard with the “unduly burdensome” standard, courts could
determine whether a disclosure was “unduly burdensome” and
could then weigh the facts before them and compare those facts
to the facts in Zauderer, where the disclosure was “purely factual
and uncontroversial.” In this sense, then, this approach recognizes the “purely factual and uncontroversial” language of Zauderer for what it was—a characterization of the facts before the
Zauderer Court—and would use the phrase merely as grounds
for a factual comparison between cases.
***
In sum, although it is highly unlikely that the Court will
overturn roughly thirty-five years of precedent, replacing the
“purely factual and uncontroversial” standard with an expanded
version of the “unduly burdensome” standard mitigates the current most problematic aspects of when and how to apply Zauderer deference, and would represent a significant upgrade over
the “purely factual and uncontroversial” test. While this expansion could face problems of its own, particularly concerns over
the intrusion of judicial bias, the fact that this approach would
236. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380–83 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 216 and accompanying text (explaining that courts are giving
increasing deference to commercial speakers).
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at least mitigate, if not also satisfy, all of the concerns raised in
Part II relatively easily make an expansion of the “unduly burdensome” standard as a substitution for the “purely factual and
uncontroversial” standard the best option for Zauderer deference
following NIFLA.
B. ADDRESSING OTHER OPTIONS
While replacing the “purely factual and uncontroversial”
standard with some version of the “unduly burdensome” test
seen in Zauderer is the best approach to fixing Zauderer deference post-NIFLA, it is certainly not the only one. This Section
briefly explores two other approaches: limiting what topics are
controversial and simply ignoring NIFLA. This Section, while acknowledging the merits of these approaches, argues that they do
not address the problematic aspects of the “purely factual and
uncontroversial” standard identified in Part II to the same degree as the solution above.
1. Limiting Which Topics Are Controversial
Specifically limiting which topics would be impermissibly
controversial under NIFLA’s interpretation of how to implement
the “uncontroversial” prong of Zauderer in future cases is the
better of the two options raised in this Section. The Court could,
for instance, limit the application of the underlying topic analysis for the “uncontroversial” prong to the abortion debate, or a
narrow list of similar topics. This could protect some disclosure
requirements in less controversial contexts, such as requirements to disclose calorie counts at restaurants.237
However, deciding which topics would qualify would be subject to the same concerns over judicial bias discussed in Part II.B.
For instance, NIFLA and Casey were highly similar factually,
but received markedly different interpretations which were arguably due to their positions on different sides of the abortion
debate.238 While the risk of bias leading to inconsistent results
and unequal treatment under the law is particularly notable in
the abortion context, it could easily extend to other topics. Some
of this risk could arguably be mitigated by having a specific body,

237. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2380–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 120, 143 and accompanying text (explaining the majority and minority
opinions relating to controversiality in NIFLA).
238. For a more detailed discussion and background of Casey, see supra note
119.
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likely the Supreme Court, establishing one specified set of categories deemed too controversial rather than determining those
categories piecemeal by numerous different judges and courts.239
Despite concerns over bias, the Court has implemented potentially problematic doctrines before and limited them to specific facts or applications. For example, secondary effects doctrine, another part of the Court’s First Amendment
Jurisprudence,240 permits regulations of speech so long as they
target the harmful secondary effects of speech, not the speech
itself.241 While this doctrine has been characterized as problematic, it has survived,242 likely due to the fact that it has primarily
been implemented in support of zoning restrictions243 on adultoriented businesses.244 The Supreme Court’s reticence to implement secondary effects doctrine outside of the context of adult
oriented businesses reflects a marked level of judicial restraint
in limiting a doctrine that many have characterized as problematic and suggests such an approach might be possible following
NIFLA.245
However, this approach would still be problematic. First, it
does not properly recognize consumer protection interests. As
shown above, consumers have a heightened interest in disclosures of information on controversial topics.246 While limiting

239. See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the problems arising from piecemeal
adoption of the “purely factual and uncontroversial” threshold).
240. See John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L.
REV. 291, 299–305 (2009) (detailing the development of secondary effects doctrine). See generally Daniel R. Aaronson et al., The First Amendment in Chaos:
How the Law of Secondary Effects Is Applied and Misapplied by the Circuit
Courts, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 741 (2009) (examining the application of secondary
effects doctrine both by the Supreme Court and at the circuit court level and
concluding that the state of the doctrine is highly confusing).
241. See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002); City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976).
242. See Fee, supra note 240, at 293–95; see also Aaronson et al., supra note
240, at 741, 744 (criticizing secondary effects doctrine as “a mess” suffering from
“seemingly random development of the law”).
243. The doctrine’s foundational cases involve zoning restrictions. See cases
cited supra note 241.
244. The Supreme Court has not, however, explicitly limited the doctrine’s
application to sexually explicit speakers or adult-oriented businesses. See Fee,
supra note 240, at 304–05.
245. See id. at 293–95.
246. See supra Part II.C.
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the scope of topics covered under the new version of the “uncontroversial” prong limits the new test’s damage to some consumers, doing so would do nothing to help consumers harmed by prohibitions on disclosures on whatever topics the Court would
decide to limit the NIFLA approach to. Second, as much restraint
as the Supreme Court might show in limiting the scope of a problematic doctrine, lower courts are often much less reticent to implement that doctrine in different concerning ways.247 Finally,
this approach continues use of the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard without mitigating or eliminating the confusion that plagued the standard even before NIFLA.248
In conclusion, limiting the scope of the NIFLA majority’s implementation of the “uncontroversial” prong of the “purely factual and uncontroversial” test by restricting the topics deemed
controversial is a viable option. It would, however, be a difficult
one to implement and still be subject to many of the same concerns raised in Part II.
2. Ignoring or Rejecting NIFLA
Finally, the Supreme Court could reject the NIFLA version
of the Zauderer test and look back to either of the two diverging
implementations of the standard in cases prior to NIFLA.249
While the Ninth Circuit’s approach250 would be better at addressing the problems flagged in Part II, neither does so to the
same extent as the solution this Note proposes.
The Ninth Circuit treated the “uncontroversial” prong of the
“purely factual and uncontroversial” standard as a measure of
the veracity of the facts in the disclosure requirement.251 Although criticized,252 this approach closely mirrors Zauderer’s employment of the phrase as a singular unit rather than a two247. See Aaronson et al., supra note 240, at 743 (noting such a trend in secondary effects doctrine).
248. See supra Part II.A.2.
249. See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text.
250. See supra Part II.A.2.
251. See, e.g., Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco., 871
F.3d 884, 892–93, 895 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that a disclosure regarding the
health risks of sugary beverages was controversial because of the contested accuracy of the facts in the disclosure); CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2017) (declaring that “‘uncontroversial’ in
this context refers to the factual accuracy of the compelled disclosure, not to its
subjective impact on the audience”).
252. See Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 984 (criticizing this approach as banal); see also AMI, 760 F.3d 18, 23, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc)
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pronged test and could mitigate most of the concerns raised in
Part II.253 First, conflating “uncontroversial” with veracity would
reduce the confusion surrounding the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard.254 Second, this approach would dramatically reduce the potential for judicial bias because determining
the factual truth of a disclosure is significantly less subjective
than determining whether an entire topic is controversial.255
Third, this approach is consistent with the consumer protection
interests at the heart of commercial speech doctrine because it
excels at providing truthful information to consumers, including
instances where consumers have a heightened interest in that
information.256
On the other hand, there are two significant drawbacks.
First, this approach would significantly lower the bar that commercial disclosure requirements must clear, a move inconsistent
with the apparent shift in First Amendment doctrine in favor of
the rights of commercial speakers.257 Rather than taking an approach of compromise and recognizing this trend (as the solution
proposed in Part II.A.2 does), this approach would leave courts
with fewer options to strike down disclosure requirements and
invite subsequent changes that could be even more subversive to
commercial disclosure requirements. Second, adoption of this approach seems somewhat unlikely because a majority of the NIFLA Court already apparently subscribed to Justice Thomas’s
reasoning even prior to the addition of Justice Kavanaugh to the
bench.
Courts could also follow the D.C. Circuit in interpreting the
“uncontroversial” prong of the “purely factual and uncontrover-

(implicitly critiquing this approach by concluding that “uncontroversial” must
mean something different than purely factual).
253. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
254. Id.; see also AMI, 760 F.3d at 34 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[I]t is
unclear how [courts] should assess . . . whether a mandatory disclosure is controversial.”).
255. For instance, in Casey the Court seemed to accept the state’s arguments
regarding the potential health risks of abortion, when those arguments have
been debunked. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881–87 (1992);
see also Bryant & Swartz, supra note 104, at 271 (noting that many anti-abortion arguments similar to those risks cited in Casey are not scientifically validated).
256. See supra Part II.C.
257. See supra Part III.A.

602

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:553

sial” as meaning that something about the message being compelled is controversial.258 However, this approach fails to address
the lack of clarity surrounding the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard.259 In addition, it only slightly narrows the
window for judicial bias: determining whether a message is controversial is not that much narrower or less subjective of a determination than determining whether a topic is controversial.260 Finally, this approach is also contrary to consumer
protection interests for the same reasons identified in Part II
which drive commercial speech doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Far more than many other bodies of law, Zauderer deference
and the doctrine surrounding compelled factual disclosures in
the commercial speech context are highly relevant to consumers.
Despite the importance of compelled commercial disclosures to
consumers, NIFLA reinterpreted Zauderer deference—particularly the “uncontroversial” prong of the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard adopted following Zauderer—in a way
that this Note has shown to fundamentally jeopardize commercial disclosure regimes. This Note has demonstrated three primary problems with the “purely factual and uncontroversial
standard”: (1) the standard is (and has been since its inception)
unclear and confusing; (2) the standard post-NIFLA subjects
commercial disclosure requirements to an impermissible potential for judicial bias; and (3) the standard as implemented in NIFLA separates the current doctrine from the consumer protection interests that it is supposed to serve. Ultimately, this Note
shows that the best way to address all of these issues—and revitalize Zauderer deference as a potent tool that governments can
rely on in serving consumers—is likely to replace the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard with an expanded version of
the “unduly burdensome” standard. The “unduly burdensome”
standard is clearer than the “purely factual and uncontroversial”
standard (aided by precedent interpreting what the standard
258. See AMI, 760 F.3d at 27.
259. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text; see also NAM II, 800
F.3d 518, 528–30 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (implying that disclosures which forced a
speaker to “confess blood on its hands” or that were the subject of WTO proceedings were controversial); Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Sch. v. Healey, 159 F.
Supp. 3d 173, 206–07 (D. Mass. 2016) (seeming to suggest that a disclosure is
“controversial” when the message it conveys would chill speech).
260. See supra Part II.B.
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means in analogous First Amendment contexts), less prone to
judicial bias because of its narrower scope, and returns Zauderer
deference to its crucial focus on consumer protection. While not
the only possible path forward, replacing the “purely factual and
uncontroversial” standard with an expanded version of the “unduly burdensome” standard is preferable to other options—such
as maintaining the post-NIFLA status quo or returning to one of
several conflicting pre-NIFLA circuit court interpretations of
Zauderer—because it addresses, if not remedies, all of the most
deeply problematic aspects of the NIFLA majority’s interpretation of Zauderer.

